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Abstract
We present BIS, a Bayesian Inference Seman-
tics, for probabilistic reasoning in natural lan-
guage. The current system is based on the
framework of Bernardy et al. (2018), but de-
parts from it in important respects. BIS makes
use of Bayesian learning for inferring a hy-
pothesis from premises. This involves estimat-
ing the probability of the hypothesis, given the
data supplied by the premises of an argument.
It uses a syntactic parser to generate typed syn-
tactic structures that serve as input to a model
generation system. Sentences are interpreted
compositionally to probabilistic programs, and
the corresponding truth values are estimated
using sampling methods. BIS successfully
deals with various probabilistic semantic phe-
nomena, including frequency adverbs, gener-
alised quantifiers, generics, and vague predi-
cates. It performs well on a number of interest-
ing probabilistic reasoning tasks. It also sus-
tains most classically valid inferences (instan-
tiation, de Morgan’s laws, etc.). To test BIS
we have built an experimental test suite with
examples of a range of probabilistic and clas-
sical inference patterns.
1 Introduction
On a traditional view of inference, the entailment
relation between the premises of an argument and
its conclusion holds iff the argument is logically
valid in a proof or model theory. More recently,
computational approaches to entailment in natu-
ral text, such as Recognising Textual Entailment
(RTE, Dagan et al. (2009)) have attempted to cap-
ture inferences that depend on lexical meaning and
real world knowledge, as well as logical structure.
In the latter sorts of inference, the conclusions of-
ten follow from the premises within a certain range
of probability values.
In this paper we present Bayesian Inference Se-
mantics (BIS), a probabilistic semantics for natu-
ral language that assigns probability values, rather
than Boolean truth-values, to sentences. The prob-
ability of a sentence is the likelihood that an
idealised speaker, as represented by our model,
would accept the assertion that it expresses. Our
framework builds on the approach proposed by
Bernardy et al. (2018). It is Bayesian in that it con-
structs models in which asserted constraints pro-
vide Bayesian evidence that models use to deter-
mine whether objects satisfy particular properties.
Objects are represented as vectors in a model
space S, and properties are subspaces in S. Sat-
isfaction of a property is expressed as mem-
bership in the corresponding subspace of S.
The probability density over the space of pos-
sible situations corresponds to the a priori
density of objects in these subspaces, and is
specified through Bayesian priors. The sys-
tem leverages the probabilistic functional pro-
gramming language WebPPL (Goodman and
Stuhlmu¨ller, 2014) to evaluate Bayesian posteri-
ors. English sentences are parsed using Ranta’s
Grammatical Framework (GF, http://www.
grammaticalframework.org/, 2004), and
the parses are compositionally mapped into inter-
pretations within BIS’s probabilistic models.
We apply BIS to inferences, most of which are
probabilistic in nature, and so closely related to
RTE concerns. We have constructed a test suite
of 78 inferences on which we have developed and
tested BIS. The premises in each argument pro-
vide Bayesian evidence for the models in which
the inference is interpreted, and its conclusion is
assigned a (posterior) probability value.1
In Section 2 we describe BIS. We explain the
syntax-model interface that our GF parses pro-
vide, and we characterise how our models are
constructed. The models employ Monte Carlo
1Our test set, and the code for BIS are available at
https://github.com/GU-CLASP/bbclm2019.
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Markov Chain (MCMC) sampling2 on objects
to estimate membership in the property classes
that correspond to the predicates identified in GF
parses of our input sentences.
Section 3 presents our inference system and our
test set. BIS currently handles a range of gen-
eralised quantifiers, sentential and VP negation,
modal and temporal adverbs, measure and com-
parative adjectives, common nouns, and a variety
of logical connectives. It treats VPs and common
nouns as monadic predicates. We show how BIS
handles both probabilistic and logically valid in-
ferences over a series of examples from the test
set. We specify the coverage that the system cur-
rently achieves for this set. We have designed
BIS to capture inferences involving gradable pred-
icates like tall, where the application of the pred-
icate is clear for upper and lower bound cases,
but increasingly indeterminate for intermediate in-
stances between these points. BIS handles argu-
ments in which neither a predicate nor its contrary
apply. It also covers both wide and narrow scope
readings of certain quantifiers.
We discuss other approaches to probabilistic se-
mantic inference in Section 4. Finally, in Section
5 we identify the issues that we plan to take up in
future work, and state our conclusions.
2 System Description
2.1 Overview
Our system for probabilistic semantics is com-
prised of three phases: (i) parsing, using the GF
tool, (ii) compositional Montegovian Semantics,
written in Haskell, and (iii) computation of entail-
ment probability.
Our syntax is encoded in the Grammatical
Framework (GF) formalism. GF converts a syn-
tactically well-formed sentence into an abstract
syntax tree, which is mapped to semantics. The
adequacy of the mapping is guaranteed by using
the same types in the GF abstract syntax as in the
Haskell semantics. The main constructions are de-
scribed below.
Our semantics blends aspects of Montague se-
mantics, vector space models, and Bayesian infer-
ence. It adopts the main ideas of Bernardy et al.
(2018), which we summarise here.
A sentence is interpreted as a probabilistic pro-
gram returning a Boolean value. Individuals are
2For detailed discussion of MCMC see Brooks (1998);
Roberts and Rosenthal (2004).
represented as (probabilistic) vectors. Other syn-
tactic categories are mapped to functional types,
following the Montague Grammar paradigm. BIS
evaluates the validity of an inference as follows. It
expresses the priors as a distribution over individ-
uals and predicates. The premises of the inference
impose conditions on the model that correspond
to Bayesian observations. We then compute the
truth-value of the conclusion using posterior dis-
tributions for input variables, yielding a Bernouilli
distribution. Its expected value (a real number be-
tween 0 and 1) corresponds to a probabilistic mea-
sure of entailment. Fig. 1 gives a schematic view
of BIS’s architecture.
This value can be computed symbolically, for
example by using the precise semantics for proba-
bilistic programming of Borgstro¨m et al. (2013).
However symbolic expressions may contain in-
tractable integrals. Therefore we resort to approx-
imating the result by using MCMC sampling, as
described by Goodman et al. (2008), and imple-
mented in their WebPPL tool.
2.2 Basics
Consider the sentence “John is a musician”. Our
GF grammar parses this sentence as:
CltoS Pos (S1 John (Bare (IsA Musician))).
We briefly review the combinators used above.
CltoS is of type Pol → Cl → S : it produces
a declarative sentence from a polarity (positive
or negative) and a declarative clause. S1 is of
type NP → AVP → Cl , taking a noun phrase
and a (possibly modified) verb phrase to return a
declarative clause. Here, AVP is understood as
VP phrase that might have been modified by a
modal adverb. There is no modifier in this exam-
ple, which is signaled by the combinator Bare , of
type VP → AVP . The types of the remaining
constants are IsA : CN → VP , John : NP , and
Musician : CN .
Because the types are the same in Haskell and
in GF, any abstract syntax tree given by GF will
be a well-typed Haskell expression. To obtain a
complete semantics, our model treats John and
Musician as random representatives of their re-
spective classes, and they are sampled accord-
ingly. Then the truth value of the sentence is eval-
uated (there is no premise in this case).
modelJohnMusician = do
john ← newInd
musician ← newPred
return (cltoS pos (s1 john (bare (isA musician))))
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Text Abstract syntax tree Probabilistic program result in (0, 1)
GF Haskell interpreter WebPPL
Syntax Semantics Sampling hyper parameters
Figure 1: Phases in our system
Running the model, with our implementation,
gives the following result:
false : 0.67 true : 0.33
In the absence of further information, an arbitrary
predicate has a chance of (around) 0.33 to hold of
an arbitrary individual. This number follows from
the way that we model predicates, as described in
Section 2.3.
To record assumptions about individuals and
predicates, we use the observe primitive of
Borgstro¨m et al. (2013), which ensures that a
given proposition holds, and so influences the
posteriors. In the MCMC implementation, if
the argument to an observe call is false, then
the corresponding choice of parameters is not
retained in the final computation of posteri-
ors. So, for instance, assume that we add
the premise that “Most people are musicians”
to the earlier example. The premise is parsed
as CltoS Pos (S1 (QNP Most Person)
(Bare (IsA Musician))), whereQNP :Quant →
CN → NP and Most :Quant . The semantics is:
modelJohnMusicianMost = do
john ← newInd
musician ← newPred
observe (cltoS pos (s1 (qNP most person)
(bare (isA musician))))
return (cltoS pos (s1 john (bare (isA musician))))
The premise raises the estimated probability value
of the conclusion to
true : 0.834 false : 0.166
2.3 Predicates and their negation
Our basic assumption is that (in the absence of
other information) individuals are drawn from a
multi-variate normal distribution of dimension k,
with a zero mean vector and a unit covariance ma-
trix, where k is a hyperparameter of the system.
Any logical predicate is represented as a subspace
of all individuals. We make the additional simpli-
fying assumption that every atomic lexical predi-
cate p is represented by three components: (1) A
vector vp. The projection of any individual x onto
this direction (x · vp) corresponds to the degree to
which x exhibits the characteristics corresponding
to p. (2) A threshold θ+p , such that if x · vp > θ+p
then x is (probabilistically) considered to satisfy p.
(3) Another threshold θ−p , such that if x · vp < θ−p ,
then the contrary of the predicate (expressed as VP
negation) applies. This procedure allows BIS to
express the indeterminacy attached to both mea-
sure and non-measure predicates in cases at the
border of a classifier, in a fully uniform way.
The vectors vp are sampled from the same
multi-variate normal distribution as individuals,
but unlike individuals, these vectors are nor-
malised. Both thresholds are sampled in a stan-
dard normal distribution. At all times, we maintain
a positive gap between these thresholds: θ−p < θ+p .
Hence, in our system, the law of the excluded mid-
dle does not hold at the linguistic level, since for a
given individual x and a predicate p we may well
have θ−p < x ·vp < θ+p . For example, it is possible
that neither “John is a musician” nor “John isn’t
a musician” apply. Notice that this is not a case
of epistemic uncertainty. Rather, in this example,
John does not clearly satisfy the property of being
a musician and, at the same time, he cannot be re-
garded as a non-musician. This state of affairs is
illustrated in Fig. 2.
2.4 Adjectives and Measure Predicates
Adjectives behave like other predicates. They
come with a direction and two thresholds, allow-
ing for the proposition “It is not the case that John
is tall, and it is not the case that John isn’t tall” to
hold in some models.
BIS supports reasoning with units of measures,
as in “John is 6 feet tall”. We can also express
height in various units of measures (“John is 180
cm tall”). To capture the scaling needed for any
metric we introduce an additional layer of inter-
pretation, which corresponds to units of measure.
Each unit of measure u is represented by a pair
of a factor fu and a bias bu, both drawn from
normal distributions. This yields a transformation
tu(x) = fux+bu. The numbers provided in the in-
put (“6”, “180”) are then compared with the trans-
formed measure predicates corresponding to the
adjective. (In our example tfeet(john ·vtall) = 6.)
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Figure 2: A representation of the predicate “musician”
and its negation. The blue and red areas indicate the
corresponding subspaces.
This allows BIS to simultaneously infer posterior
distributions for individuals, predicates and units
of measures.
2.5 Quantifiers
BIS uses the same mechanism for handling quan-
tifiers as Bernardy et al. (2018) do. To interpret a
sentence such as “Most musicians are tall”, it runs
an inner instance of an inference corresponding to
“If x is a musician, then x is tall”. Then, it im-
poses, as a posterior of the outer model, the con-
dition that the probabilistic evaluation of the inner
inference is higher than a given threshold θmost.
We allow a sentence to contain several gener-
alised quantifiers, such as in “Most bass players
are taller than most guitarists”, and there are two
possibilities to consider when implementing sup-
port for this. The first is to nest one application of
the above procedure within another. This gives an
inner model “If x is a bass player, then x is taller
than most guitarists”, and an inner-inner inference
problem “If y is a guitarist, then x is taller than y”.
The other is to use a single inner model, with si-
multaneous quantification over all variables: “If x
is a bass players and y is a guitarist, then x is taller
than y”. The first interpretation is inefficient. Each
inner model demands a separate MCMC sampling.
When running two-levels of sampling the speed
is inversely propositional to the square of samples
used. But the second interpretation is not quite
correct. The threshold that is being used can only
commutatively compound the thresholds of both
quantifiers that are used. Therefore, the model
would not distinguish between the sentences “Ev-
ery bass player is taller than most guitarists” and
“Most bass players are taller than every guitarist”,
although their semantics are distinct. For this rea-
son, we opt for the inefficient but precise first pro-
cedure, even while we recognise that the second
option is a viable way of doing rough grained es-
timated reasoning.
Finally, we note that it is very inefficient to use
the inner-instance sampling method to ensure that
a model satisfies sentences containing the univer-
sal quantifier, such as “Every musician is a logi-
cian”. The priors must be set in a particular way
to ensure that the subspace of “musicians” is in-
cluded in that of “logicians”. The defining vec-
tors must be exactly parallel. Therefore sampling
converges slowly. To deal with this problem we in-
stead impose on the model the requirement that the
cosine similarity between the vectors correspond-
ing to “musician” and “logician” is greater than
0.99, and that the threshold θ+musician is greater
than θ+logician. These conditions produce a near-
perfect containment of “musician” in “logician”.
3 Test Suite
In order to illustrate BIS’s coverage we have con-
structed a test suite. We construct a test suite rather
than use any of the existing test suites for infer-
ence because all of the latter (e.g. the FraCaS test
suite (Cooper et al., 1996), RTE (Dagan et al.,
2006), and SNLI (Bowman et al., 2015)) are not
designed to assess probabilistic inference, but cat-
egorical entailment. They are annotated for three-
way (YES, NO, UNK), or binary (YES, NO) val-
ues for entailment. In the latter case, the categories
NO and UNK of the three-way task are collapsed
into a single category. By contrast, we are inter-
ested in capturing the full distribution of probabil-
ity over an inference. Our suite includes 78 exam-
ples, each with one or more premises followed by
a conclusion. The examples are annotated with re-
spect to the semantic phenomena that figure in the
inference. Here is the first example from our test
suite:
(T1) P1. Every violinist is a musician.
P2. Musicians generally read music.
H. If John is a violinist, then John reads music.
Label: QUANTIFIER, MODAL ADVERB
Below, we describe several phenomena that an
adequate natural language inference system ought
to capture. These are particularly important for se-
mantic frameworks designed to handle probabilis-
tic reasoning. While most examples in the current
version of the test suite involve probabilistic rea-
soning, others are classically valid entailments.
We briefly comment on the current state of the
art of our system with respect to each of the ex-
amples that we present. It is important to note
that none of the inferences in our test suite turn
on real world knowledge, beyond the information
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contained in the premises. This is due to the fact
that our models estimate the likelihood of an in-
ference as the conditional probability of the con-
clusion, given the premises. The premises serve
as priors on the models generated to evaluate the
conclusion. The models sample the possible rela-
tions among the individuals and properties that in-
terpret the NPs and predicates in the conclusion,
given only the restrictions imposed by the rela-
tions among the individuals and the properties that
interpret the statements in the premises.
All the phenomena presented in this section (as
seen in examples under the label (Tn), where n
is a number of an example in the test suite) are
supported by our system.
3.1 Relation to classical logic
Although our main goal is not to embed a partic-
ular logic into our system, it is useful to know the
relation between our system and a specified logic.
This allows us to evaluate whether our system can
be used in situations where precise reasoning is re-
quired.
BIS nearly supports full classical propositional
logic, using the sentential connectives “and”, “or”,
“if ... then ...”, together with “it is not the case
that”. To see that it goes beyond intuitionistic
propositional logic we check that it validates the
law of the excluded middle, de Morgan’s laws, and
Peirce’s formula. However, BIS does not sustain
reductio ad absurdum as a rule of inference. The
system evaluates an inference by constructing a
model for the premises of the inference and evalu-
ating the hypothesis in that model. This means that
in arguments where the premises are inconsistent
(as would be the case in an attempt to use reduc-
tio) the system fails to construct such a model. It
would not evaluate the hypothesis in that model,
yielding no result at all. Therefore the conse-
quence relation is not monotone, as the addition
of an extra inconsistent premise makes the com-
putation diverge. By contrast, the system assigns
probability 1 to |= A∧¬A→ B for any choice of
A and B.
VP-level negation does not interact with sen-
tential negation in the way that one might expect.
GF only provides binary clausal polarity, whereas
our implementation of predicates requires a many-
valued logic. Therefore, VP negation in exam-
ples such as “John isn’t a guitarist” rules out both
that John is a guitarist, and that John is in the
undecided area between θ−guitarist and θ
+
guitarist.
Hence, “John isn’t a guitarist” implies “It is not
the case that John is a guitarist”, but the converse
implication does not hold. As a consequence of
our treatment of VP negation, the universal quan-
tifier (“all”) and the existential quantifier (“some”)
are not interdefinable, as they are in classical logic.
So, for example, “All musicians read music” im-
plies “It is not the case that some musicians don’t
read music”, but not the other way around.
Instantiation: Instantiation, one of the main in-
ference rules in the Aristotelian syllogism, is sup-
ported in our system. The following test suite ex-
ample is evaluated as true with probability 1.
(T31) P1. All intermediate logic students are Stones fans.
P2. John is an intermediate logic student.
H. John is a Stones fan.
Label: INSTANTIATION
Chains of universal affirmatives: The system
does not perform very well on examples that chain
universal quantifiers together to form valid FOL
inferences. Consider the following:
(T76) P1. All violinists are musicians.
P2. All musicians read music.
H. All violinists read music.
Label: QUANTIFIERS, FOL VALIDITY
Here, we would expect a probability of 1 for the
conclusion, but the actual result is slightly lower.
The reason for this is that our system evaluates the
universal quantifier by measuring the cosine simi-
larity between the corresponding vectors (> 0.99)
as well as comparing the thresholds θ+p for the two
predicates. Even if the cosine similarity between
the vectors corresponding to “violinist” and “mu-
sician” is close to 1, and the one between “musi-
cian” and “read music” is also, this does not imply
that the cosine similarity between “violinist” and
“read music” is 1.
By contrast, the following example is assigned a
probability close to 1, because the percentage de-
terminer is treated as a generalised quantifier, trig-
gering an inner-model inference.
(T77) P1. All violinists are musicians.
P2. All musicians read music.
H. 99 percent of violinists read music.
Label: QUANTIFIERS, PERCENTAGE DETER-
MINER
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Higher-order case: Universally quantified sen-
tences connected via implications Consider an
example with more complex cases of conditionals
of the form “if X then Y ”, where X and Y are
quantified assertions.
(T78) P1. Every guitarist is a logician.
P2. If every guitarist is a logician, then every musi-
cian reads music.
P3. John is a musician.
H. John reads music.
Label: IMPLICATION, QUANTIFIER, PROPER
NAME
BIS performs well for (T78), assigning the in-
ference a probability close to 1. To test that it
works as expected for P2 of (T78), we substitute
“Few musicians read music” for “Every musician
reads music”. BIS assigns the conclusion false
with a high probability to H of (T78), which is a
reasonable estimated value for this variant of the
argument pattern.
3.2 Generalised quantifiers and generics
In addition to examples with universal quantifica-
tion, our test suite includes cases with other gen-
eralised quantifiers (few, most, etc.), and generics
expressed as bare plurals.
(T54) P1. Few people are basketball players.
P2. Basketball players are taller than most non bas-
ketball players.
P3. John is a basketball player.
H. John is taller than most people.
Label: COMPARATIVE ADJECTIVE, MODAL AD-
VERB
3.3 Gradation, Adjectives, and Comparatives
We test our system on gradation, adjectival modi-
fication, and comparatives against the sorts of ex-
amples discussed in the linguistic semantics liter-
ature, e.g. by Klein (1980).
In English, a (positive) adjective such as “tall”
can be turned into the comparative “taller”, which
has the property of transitivity (if XtallerY and
Y tallerZ, then XtallerZ). Moreover, the adjec-
tive and the comparative derived from it are re-
lated in meaning, as the example (T15) illustrates
(H holds given that P1 and P2 hold). If XtallerY
and tall(Y ), then tall(X).
BIS does well on tasks where an inference in-
volves transitivity of a relation expressed as a com-
parative adjective. The system computes a proba-
bility of 1 for (T15).
(T15) P1. Mary is tall.
P2. John is taller than Mary.
H. John is tall.
Label: COMPARATIVE ADJECTIVE, TRANSITIV-
ITY
3.4 Modal Adverbs
BIS handles modal adverbs, such as “usually”,
“always”, “rarely” (sometimes called adverbs of
frequency), which can be used to turn categor-
ical judgments into probabilistic ones. Exam-
ples where both adverbs of frequency and quan-
tifiers (including generics and generalised quanti-
fiers) interact are particularly interesting. They are
not only complex from a computational modelling
perspective. They are also semantically difficult.
Their interpretations are not straightforward.
As we are interested in probabilistic judgments,
we test our model against similar examples that
contain probabilistic modifiers, as in (T17) below.
The main difference between (T15) and (T17), is
that (T17) contains the modal frequency adverbs
“usually” and “always” that interact with a com-
parative. They trigger frequency based semantic
relations that condition probabilistic inferences.
(T17) P1. John is always as punctual as Mary.
P2. Sam is usually more punctual than John.
H. Sam is more punctual than Mary.
Label: QUANTIFIER, MODAL/TEMPORAL AD-
VERB
BIS computes a value of 0.7 for this example.
3.5 Vagueness
Finally, we take up measure predicates that involve
vagueness.
(T38) P1. Mary is 190 centimeters tall. Mary is tall.
P2. Molly is 184 centimeters tall. Molly is tall.
P3. Ruth is 180 centimeters tall. Ruth is tall.
P4. Helen is 178 centimeters tall. Helen is tall.
P5. Athena is 166 centimeters tall. Athena isn’t tall.
P6. Artemis is 157 centimeters tall. Artemis isn’t
tall.
P7. Joanna is 160 centimeters tall. Joanna isn’t tall.
P8. Kate is 162 centimeters tall. Kate isn’t tall.
P9. Christine is x centimeters tall.
H. Chistine isn’t tall
Label: QUANTIFIER, MODAL ADVERB
We perform 15 runs for 18 values of x uni-
formly distributed in the range 145cm to 201cm.
BIS generates encouraging results for this case.
The conclusion is always true with high probabil-
ity where x is lower than 166, the highest measure-
ment judged to be not tall. There is a slight devia-
tion when x is 166, where 3 cases return false with
269
probabilities from 0.5 to 0.85. In the intermediate
cases, for which we expect the vagueness effect,
we see a near incremental increase of false judg-
ments values with higher probabilities. From 174
cm and upwards, the system returns false consis-
tently. After the lowest judgment of tallness (178),
the system returns false with very high probability
(many cases are 1).
BIS offers a gradient treatment of measure pred-
icates (through tweaking of priors), expressing
vagueness, but it is not yet fully incremental or sta-
ble. We seem to be on the right track in our treat-
ment of measure predicates. Improving this aspect
of BIS is one of our priorities for future work.
4 Related and Future Work
We do not have any baseline to compare our sys-
tem to. The only implemented approach similar
to ours is the one proposed by Goodman and Las-
siter (2015); Lassiter and Goodman (2017). This
system is not tested against a test suite. Further-
more, it is not designed to deal with the range
of syntactic structures or complex inference pat-
terns that BIS handles. Adapting the Goodman-
Lassiter model to allow for such testing would re-
quire changes that undermine a comparison with
BIS.
Goodman and Lassiter (2015); Lassiter and
Goodman (2017) implement a probabilistic se-
mantics in WebPPL. They regard the probability
of a declarative sentence as the most highly valued
interpretation that a hearer assigns to the utterance
of a speaker in a specified context. On this ap-
proach, speakers express unambiguous meanings
in specified contexts through their utterances, and
hearers estimate the likelihood of distinct interpre-
tations as corresponding to those that the speaker
intends to convey. Their account requires the ex-
istence of a univocal, non-vague speakers mean-
ing that hearers seek to identify by distributing
probability among alternative readings. Goodman
and Lassiter posit a boundary point parameter for
graded modifiers, where the value of this parame-
ter is determined in context. They adopt a classical
Montagovian treatment of generalised quantifiers,
and their framework has limited coverage of syn-
tactic and semantic structures.
We take the probability value of a sentence to be
the likelihood that a competent speaker would en-
dorse an assertion, given specified premises. Pred-
ication is intrinsically vague, and we do not as-
sume a sharply delimited reading for a predica-
tion that hearers attempt to converge on by es-
timating the probability of alternative readings.
All predication consists in applying a classifier to
new instances, on the basis of supervised training.
BIS does not posit a contextually dependent cut
off boundary for graded predicates or non-graded
predicates. Instead, we adopt an integrated ap-
proach to both types of classifier on which a prop-
erty term allows for vague borders. BIS applies a
probabilistic treatment of generalised quantifiers,
and it covers higher-order quantifiers like most.
The design of BIS is inspired by the Bayesian
compositional semantic framework proposed by
Bernardy et al. (2018). But BIS differs from
this framework in a number of important respects.
First, it has a comprehensive syntax-semantics in-
terface through GF parsing. Second, it is intended
to cover inference in a systematic way, including
logically valid, as well as probabilistic arguments.
Third, BIS has considerably wider coverage than
the framework of Bernardy et al. (2018), and it is
constructed in such a way as to permit straightfor-
ward extension to new types of sentence structure
and inference patterns.
van Eijck and Lappin (2012) distribute proba-
bility values for natural language sentences over
the set of possible worlds. The probability of a
sentence is the sum of the probability values of
the worlds in which it is true. If these worlds are
understood as maximal consistent sets of propo-
sitions, as in classical theories of formal seman-
tics, then it is unclear how they can be represented
in a computationally tractable way.3 Our system
avoids these problems by sampling only the in-
dividuals and properties (vector dimensions) re-
quired to estimate the probability of a given set
of statements.
Cooper et al. (2015) propose a composi-
tional semantics within a probabilistic type theory
(ProbTTR). They take the probability of a sen-
tence to be a judgment on the likelihood that a
given situation is of a particular type, specified in
terms of ProbTTR. They do not offer an explicit
treatment of vagueness or probabilistic inference.
It is also not clear to what extent their type the-
ory is required to achieve a viable compositional
probabilistic semantics.
Emerson and Copestake (2017a,b) provide a
3Lappin (2015) discusses the complexity problems posed
by the representation of complete worlds.
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probabilistic model in order to identify ‘features’
of objects in terms of the properties that apply to
those objects. They build their model as a graph-
ical probabilistic model. They also interpret uni-
versal and existential quantifiers from a probabilis-
tic perspective. “As are Bs” is represented as a
conditional probability of B given A, for all el-
ements of the space, which is equal to the sum
(integral) over all elements. To compute it, they
make use of the variational inference for graphical
probabilistic models.
Pfeifer and colleagues (Pfeifer and Sanfilippo,
2018; Pfeifer, 2013; Gilio et al., 2015) study in-
ference in a probabilistic setting by estimating the
probability of the conclusion given the probabil-
ities of the premises. They employ p-validity by
Adams (1998). To be p-valid the uncertainty of
a conclusion in an inference should not increase
the cumulative uncertainties of its premises. Their
approach differs from ours in several ways. The
main one is that we build a model (using Bayesian
updating of priors) where the premises hold, and
then we observe how probable the hypothesis is in
this model. By contrast, they provide an analytic
estimation of the conclusion, given its premises.
They require that certain properties on conditional
probabilities hold. Conditional probabilities are
primitives for modelling an implication (“ifA then
B”). This allows them to avoid problems when es-
timating A → B when A is false. In the current
work, we take “if...then...” statements to be cases
of material implication (A → B = ¬A ∨ B) in-
stead of conditional probability.
In future work we will explore the interpretation
of the “if...then...” construction as a conditional
probability, and we may incorporate Pfeifer and
colleagues’ insights into our semantics.
We plan to extend the current test suite to ex-
amples that contain phenomena which are not yet
represented there. This will allow us to increase
both BIS’ coverage and its power. We intend to
organise the test suite in a more structured way,
by introducing a more systematic and fine-grained
classification of example types, and example com-
plexity. To illustrate what we have in mind, imag-
ine that BIS gives the correct result for test suite
example n1, but fails on n2, where the two cases
are labelled as of the same type, but n2 is simpler
than n1. Given such a typology and complexity
hierarchy over examples, it becomes easier to de-
tect the source of peculiar behaviour in the system.
We will also take into account that some examples
might not make sense in a probabilistic setting.
As Suppes (1966) remarks, statistical syllogisms
require a specific formulation in order to be well
posed as probabilistic problems. Building such a
structured test suite is a challenging task.
In our model, we have sentence-level and
predicate-level negation, which we refer to as
weak and strong negation, respectively. In this
way, we obtain a logic which deviates from both
classical first-order and intuitionistic logic. We
will explore the formal properties of this alterna-
tive logic, and we will consider the most efficient
way of encoding it in BIS.
We observed in the previous section that
chained transitive inferences become problematic
for BIS in proportion to the length of the chain.
This is due to errors that originate in Monte Carlo
Methods of approximating integrals, which BIS
uses to generate its models. We will experiment
with an alternative approach that calculates the re-
quired integrals symbolically. On this strategy BIS
would invoke Monte Carlo Methods only as a last
resort, when symbolic computation is not feasible.
5 Conclusion
This paper describes BIS, an implemented
Bayesian system for probabilistic inference. We
have tested BIS on a test suite for probabilistic and
classically valid arguments, which we have con-
structed for this task. While the test suite is still
under development, it is, to our knowledge, unique
in that its examples make probabilistic judgments
based purely on the knowledge contained in the
premises. The arguments do not require addi-
tional world knowledge beyond the information
contributed by the premises to support their con-
clusions. We will reorganise and extend this suite
to achieve a fine-grained, labelled typology for its
examples.
While BIS follows the approach outlined by
Bernardy et al. (2018) in many respects, it handles
a wider and richer range of phenomena. In addi-
tion to providing a systematic Bayesian inference
system, it offers a unique treatment of vagueness
through a distinction between two types of nega-
tion, and an alternative procedure for computing
interpretations for quantifiers.
We have also noted some of the limitations of
the current system. Most of these are due to the
fact that BIS does not yet encode certain linguis-
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tic phenomena. Other problems arise because of
BIS’s current method for sampling and comput-
ing (numerical) approximations. We will address
these issues in future work. BIS’s current level of
performance suggests that it can be scaled up to
a wide coverage semantic system for probabilistic
natural language inference.
In extending our test suite our primary objec-
tive is to provide a better platform for evaluating
probabilistic semantic approaches. One way of
obtaining more reliable gradient judgments of en-
tailment is to submit inferences to crowd source
assessment on a four or five point scale, and to
map this scale into probability values (or ranges
of values). The mean judgments of such an anno-
tated suite would provide a gold standard for eval-
uating the performance of a probabilistic inference
system. We are also interested in testing BIS on
a standard dataset for logical inference, like the
FraCaS test suite, that is annotated for categori-
cal inference judgments. Success would consist in
assigning high probability to yes cases, low prob-
ability to no cases, and intermediate values to unk
instances. We could also crowd source the FraCas
set, and use the mean judgments that we obtain as
the target values for our system.
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